Abstract
This Critical Incident Analysis (C.I.A.) reviews an on-going interaction between members of a
U.S. based technical investigation team and a group of managers and technical specialists located
at corporate headquarters in Japan. The expectations and outcomes of the meetings held to date
will be summarized with specific emphasis on the cultural disconnects encountered. This review
will be followed by a brief analysis using the theoretical framework established by Hofstede as
well recommendations for improvements in the future interactions that the two groups will have
with each other.
This Critical Incident Analysis (C.I.A.) will introduce the reader to a real-life, on-going cultural
the situation at my place of employment. A technical investigation team, of which I am a member, has been tasked with understanding the root causes of certain production issues currently experienced in our chemistry laboratory in the United States. This U.S. team is made up of U.S. and Canadian nationals and has been involved in a series of conference calls with management and technical experts located at our corporate headquarters in Japan. Several cultural differences and potential misunderstandings between the U.S. team and those in Japan have come to light throughout the course of these calls and subsequent follow-on activities.
Situation
One of the products manufactured in our chemistry laboratory has experienced a high rate of
failure, as well as a high degree of lot-to-lot variation, in the final quality test performed at our facility.
While this testing ensures that our global customers are receiving only the highest quality material from us, a high scrap rate means that our business is wasting a lot of resources, time, and money while also facing the risk of possibly not providing enough product to meet market demand. It is therefore quite
understandable that not only our local management in the U.S. but also management at our corporate
headquarters, are deeply concerned and are requesting a timely, effective resolution of this quality issue.
I am part of the technical investigation team commissioned with the task of understanding the
root causes of the product variation and low process yield our business unit is experiencing. Our corporate
management in Japan asked to be briefed on this investigation shortly after it began, and the technical
lead for our team, Chris G. took the lead on what has become a series of conference calls. The majority of the Japanese management team and the technical experts on their end only speak Japanese. All of the U.S.-based team members only speak English. For this C.I.A., I interviewed Chris G. who is our Principal Chemist and is also the manager of our chemistry business unit.
Chris G. believes that the original intent behind the meeting request was two-fold: corporate
management sincerely desired to find out if they could provide any technical assistance to help solve the production problems, as well as to provide oversight to ensure that the investigation was being handled diligently and thoroughly, that our team was not jumping to conclusions. Our task, then, has been to present very high-level summaries of our investigational plans and findings and to pose technical questions that we could use assistance with, all the while seeking to assure corporate management that we have a highly qualified team performing a rigorous and detailed investigation. Needless to say, high-level summaries do not easily reveal the thoroughness of the work being done, so even before any cultural
differences are addressed Chris G. has needed to balance these critical business needs.
Throughout the course of these conference calls and follow up emails, we have learned several
important lessons, many of them also requiring delicate balancing.
One example is that all communications require a translator – thus, all presentation materials
must be provided well ahead of the appointed meeting time, and the language in them, while necessarily
including some technical terms, must be in plain, straightforward English. The initial presentation
materials the team drafted were reworded for clarity and simplicity by our U.S.-based Vice President,
Chris Z. Although Chris Z is an American, he has had a great deal of experience working with his
Japanese counterparts and senior officials. Simultaneously, we constantly need to make sure that the
information is presented in a way that does not insult the intelligence of the Japanese. The verbal and
written communications flowing back from Japan must also go through the same translator. While it is
highly possible that meaning becomes lost in translation, it has been observed that the responses from the
Japanese have not been as directly worded or as detailed as the information we have provided and the
questions posed to them.
Application of Theoretical Framework
This paper will now investigate some of the challenges experienced in these U.S. – Japan
interactions through the lens of culture. The work of Geert Hofstede, a highly regarded Dutch social
scientist and psychologist, provides a framework for developing an understanding of the major
organizational behavior differences between various national cultures (International Business, Chapter 3
Culture and Business, 2012, p.11). His research revealed that to help define the values that are driving
observed behaviors, five key cultural dimensions should be explored: Power Distance, Individualism -
Collectivism, Masculinity – Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-term vs. Short-term
Orientation (Krietner & Kinicki, 2012, p.100). For brevity, this discussion will focus on two: Power
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance (in this situation, Long-term vs. Short-term Orientation is closely
related to Uncertainty Avoidance).
Power Distance
The Power Distance, or the assumption of inequality between people in different levels of the
organization, is more apparent with the Japanese. Our Vice President, Chris Z. needs to participate in all
of the conference calls and be copied on all of the emails related to these conference calls. From our
perspective, this is because he genuinely wants to be engaged in the solution and is willing and able to
help clear up any misunderstandings that develop. I believe from the Japanese perspective his
participation is required to lend credibility to the work that the team is doing and to provide an equal-toequal
element to the conversation. While Chris G. is responsible for the meeting preparation, execution,
and follow up activities (including sending notes of appreciation to all participating from Japan), Chris Z.
bridges the Power Gap that would otherwise exist. On multiple occasions when Chris G. feels that a
response from Japan has not been as direct or detailed as he needs, he has followed up with a clearlyworded
email requesting specific response. If on this second attempt he receives a similar or even
duplicate response, he has not continued to pursue that line of questioning in deference to his Japanese
superiors.
Uncertainty Avoidance
It has been evident that our Japanese management places a high importance of being as certain as
possible before pursuing a course of action. Our American tendency to experiment and learn from trialand-
error has been tempered by the Japanese oversight. Although our technical investigation team is now
performing multiple experiments, this experimentation began after exhaustive data analysis and research.
Whereas in the past, teams at our location have tended to find likely causes (at times instead of true root
causes) and driven ahead with solutions that ‘should’ work, our team is committed to finding real
solutions to the real problems. By forging ahead only after the team has a high degree of certainty of a
successful outcome, this practice also aligns well with the Japanese desire for solutions that will last
(long-term) instead of needing to be revisited because they only fixed the problem for a limited time.
Recommendations
Reflecting on the on-going interactions with Japan using the I.C.E. methodology and Hofstede’s
framework has given both Chris G. and I some insights into how better to proceed in the future. While
there are certainly some similarities - both groups appreciate timeliness (both are monochronic), and a
common objective (identification of true root cause(s) and permanent corrective action(s)), real cultural
differences are readily apparent. We need to continue to acknowledge their contributions and validate
their input while understanding that their brief responses, like “yes” (even when the word “yes” is written
in an email) may also simply be an acknowledgement on their part, and that we should not expect their
validation of our work until the results are proven. We also need to leverage our Vice President, Chris Z.
more, not only to intellectually improve our own cultural awareness, but also to act as an intermediary on
a more frequent basis. Finally, it might help to request the on-site help of one of the technical experts
from Japan, having him or her visit our location for face-to-face discussions so that the high-context
communications the Japanese prefer might be more effective.
Conclusions
There is yet so much to learn in this situation, but the experience so far has been immensely
valuable; I am certain that it will ultimately be very rewarding as well. By modifying our expectations,
utilizing our Vice President more, and encouraging face-to-face discussions, I am eager to successfully
address both the technical and the relational challenges we are experiencing. It is not just my own selfefficacy
that leads me to believe this is possible, but it is my confidence in my team and in my company
as well.
References
Cultural Intelligence for Leaders. (2012). Saylor Academy. Creative Commons by-nc-sa 3.0.
Retrieved Sep 6, 2018, from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_leading-with-culturalintelligence/
index.html
HumberEdu. (2015, Nov 13). Leadership and Management, Part 4 of 4: The Iceberg of
Organizational Culture. [Video File]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjziCs-R2S4
International Business, Chapter 3 Culture and Business. (2012). Saylor Academy. Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License. Retrieved Oct 4, 2018,
from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_international-business/s07-culture-andbusiness.
html
Krietner, R. & Kinicki, A. (2012). Chapter 4 - International Organization Behaviour: Managing
Across Cultures. In The World of Organizational Behaviour. New York: McGraw Hill.
Retrieved Oct 5, 2018, from
https://my.uopeople.edu/pluginfile.php/325648/mod_book/chapter/166086/Unit%205%2
0-%20Kreitner%20and%20Kinicki.pdf
Serrat, O. (2010). The Critical Incident Technique. Cornell University, ILR School. Asian
Development Bank. Retrieved from
https://my.uopeople.edu/pluginfile.php/325648/mod_book/chapter/166086/Unit%205%2
0-%20Serriat.pdf
This Critical Incident Analysis (C.I.A.) reviews an on-going interaction between members of a
U.S. based technical investigation team and a group of managers and technical specialists located
at corporate headquarters in Japan. The expectations and outcomes of the meetings held to date
will be summarized with specific emphasis on the cultural disconnects encountered. This review
will be followed by a brief analysis using the theoretical framework established by Hofstede as
well recommendations for improvements in the future interactions that the two groups will have
with each other.
This Critical Incident Analysis (C.I.A.) will introduce the reader to a real-life, on-going cultural
the situation at my place of employment. A technical investigation team, of which I am a member, has been tasked with understanding the root causes of certain production issues currently experienced in our chemistry laboratory in the United States. This U.S. team is made up of U.S. and Canadian nationals and has been involved in a series of conference calls with management and technical experts located at our corporate headquarters in Japan. Several cultural differences and potential misunderstandings between the U.S. team and those in Japan have come to light throughout the course of these calls and subsequent follow-on activities.
Situation
One of the products manufactured in our chemistry laboratory has experienced a high rate of
failure, as well as a high degree of lot-to-lot variation, in the final quality test performed at our facility.
While this testing ensures that our global customers are receiving only the highest quality material from us, a high scrap rate means that our business is wasting a lot of resources, time, and money while also facing the risk of possibly not providing enough product to meet market demand. It is therefore quite
understandable that not only our local management in the U.S. but also management at our corporate
headquarters, are deeply concerned and are requesting a timely, effective resolution of this quality issue.
I am part of the technical investigation team commissioned with the task of understanding the
root causes of the product variation and low process yield our business unit is experiencing. Our corporate
management in Japan asked to be briefed on this investigation shortly after it began, and the technical
lead for our team, Chris G. took the lead on what has become a series of conference calls. The majority of the Japanese management team and the technical experts on their end only speak Japanese. All of the U.S.-based team members only speak English. For this C.I.A., I interviewed Chris G. who is our Principal Chemist and is also the manager of our chemistry business unit.
Chris G. believes that the original intent behind the meeting request was two-fold: corporate
management sincerely desired to find out if they could provide any technical assistance to help solve the production problems, as well as to provide oversight to ensure that the investigation was being handled diligently and thoroughly, that our team was not jumping to conclusions. Our task, then, has been to present very high-level summaries of our investigational plans and findings and to pose technical questions that we could use assistance with, all the while seeking to assure corporate management that we have a highly qualified team performing a rigorous and detailed investigation. Needless to say, high-level summaries do not easily reveal the thoroughness of the work being done, so even before any cultural
differences are addressed Chris G. has needed to balance these critical business needs.
Throughout the course of these conference calls and follow up emails, we have learned several
important lessons, many of them also requiring delicate balancing.
One example is that all communications require a translator – thus, all presentation materials
must be provided well ahead of the appointed meeting time, and the language in them, while necessarily
including some technical terms, must be in plain, straightforward English. The initial presentation
materials the team drafted were reworded for clarity and simplicity by our U.S.-based Vice President,
Chris Z. Although Chris Z is an American, he has had a great deal of experience working with his
Japanese counterparts and senior officials. Simultaneously, we constantly need to make sure that the
information is presented in a way that does not insult the intelligence of the Japanese. The verbal and
written communications flowing back from Japan must also go through the same translator. While it is
highly possible that meaning becomes lost in translation, it has been observed that the responses from the
Japanese have not been as directly worded or as detailed as the information we have provided and the
questions posed to them.
Application of Theoretical Framework
This paper will now investigate some of the challenges experienced in these U.S. – Japan
interactions through the lens of culture. The work of Geert Hofstede, a highly regarded Dutch social
scientist and psychologist, provides a framework for developing an understanding of the major
organizational behavior differences between various national cultures (International Business, Chapter 3
Culture and Business, 2012, p.11). His research revealed that to help define the values that are driving
observed behaviors, five key cultural dimensions should be explored: Power Distance, Individualism -
Collectivism, Masculinity – Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Long-term vs. Short-term
Orientation (Krietner & Kinicki, 2012, p.100). For brevity, this discussion will focus on two: Power
Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance (in this situation, Long-term vs. Short-term Orientation is closely
related to Uncertainty Avoidance).
Power Distance
The Power Distance, or the assumption of inequality between people in different levels of the
organization, is more apparent with the Japanese. Our Vice President, Chris Z. needs to participate in all
of the conference calls and be copied on all of the emails related to these conference calls. From our
perspective, this is because he genuinely wants to be engaged in the solution and is willing and able to
help clear up any misunderstandings that develop. I believe from the Japanese perspective his
participation is required to lend credibility to the work that the team is doing and to provide an equal-toequal
element to the conversation. While Chris G. is responsible for the meeting preparation, execution,
and follow up activities (including sending notes of appreciation to all participating from Japan), Chris Z.
bridges the Power Gap that would otherwise exist. On multiple occasions when Chris G. feels that a
response from Japan has not been as direct or detailed as he needs, he has followed up with a clearlyworded
email requesting specific response. If on this second attempt he receives a similar or even
duplicate response, he has not continued to pursue that line of questioning in deference to his Japanese
superiors.
Uncertainty Avoidance
It has been evident that our Japanese management places a high importance of being as certain as
possible before pursuing a course of action. Our American tendency to experiment and learn from trialand-
error has been tempered by the Japanese oversight. Although our technical investigation team is now
performing multiple experiments, this experimentation began after exhaustive data analysis and research.
Whereas in the past, teams at our location have tended to find likely causes (at times instead of true root
causes) and driven ahead with solutions that ‘should’ work, our team is committed to finding real
solutions to the real problems. By forging ahead only after the team has a high degree of certainty of a
successful outcome, this practice also aligns well with the Japanese desire for solutions that will last
(long-term) instead of needing to be revisited because they only fixed the problem for a limited time.
Recommendations
Reflecting on the on-going interactions with Japan using the I.C.E. methodology and Hofstede’s
framework has given both Chris G. and I some insights into how better to proceed in the future. While
there are certainly some similarities - both groups appreciate timeliness (both are monochronic), and a
common objective (identification of true root cause(s) and permanent corrective action(s)), real cultural
differences are readily apparent. We need to continue to acknowledge their contributions and validate
their input while understanding that their brief responses, like “yes” (even when the word “yes” is written
in an email) may also simply be an acknowledgement on their part, and that we should not expect their
validation of our work until the results are proven. We also need to leverage our Vice President, Chris Z.
more, not only to intellectually improve our own cultural awareness, but also to act as an intermediary on
a more frequent basis. Finally, it might help to request the on-site help of one of the technical experts
from Japan, having him or her visit our location for face-to-face discussions so that the high-context
communications the Japanese prefer might be more effective.
Conclusions
There is yet so much to learn in this situation, but the experience so far has been immensely
valuable; I am certain that it will ultimately be very rewarding as well. By modifying our expectations,
utilizing our Vice President more, and encouraging face-to-face discussions, I am eager to successfully
address both the technical and the relational challenges we are experiencing. It is not just my own selfefficacy
that leads me to believe this is possible, but it is my confidence in my team and in my company
as well.
References
Cultural Intelligence for Leaders. (2012). Saylor Academy. Creative Commons by-nc-sa 3.0.
Retrieved Sep 6, 2018, from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_leading-with-culturalintelligence/
index.html
HumberEdu. (2015, Nov 13). Leadership and Management, Part 4 of 4: The Iceberg of
Organizational Culture. [Video File]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjziCs-R2S4
International Business, Chapter 3 Culture and Business. (2012). Saylor Academy. Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License. Retrieved Oct 4, 2018,
from https://saylordotorg.github.io/text_international-business/s07-culture-andbusiness.
html
Krietner, R. & Kinicki, A. (2012). Chapter 4 - International Organization Behaviour: Managing
Across Cultures. In The World of Organizational Behaviour. New York: McGraw Hill.
Retrieved Oct 5, 2018, from
https://my.uopeople.edu/pluginfile.php/325648/mod_book/chapter/166086/Unit%205%2
0-%20Kreitner%20and%20Kinicki.pdf
Serrat, O. (2010). The Critical Incident Technique. Cornell University, ILR School. Asian
Development Bank. Retrieved from
https://my.uopeople.edu/pluginfile.php/325648/mod_book/chapter/166086/Unit%205%2
0-%20Serriat.pdf
Comments
Post a Comment